In this paper it is investigated whether CBI-reforms matter for in ‡ation performance using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach. The analysis is based on a novel data set including the possible occurence of CBI-reforms in 133 countries during the period 1980-2003. The results does not support the popular view that CBI-reforms are important for improving in ‡ation performance. There is, however, some evidence that CBI-reforms are more e¢ cient in bringing down in ‡ation in countries characterized by historically high in ‡ation rates.
Introduction
In recent years many countries have implemented institutional reforms that formally establish the independence of central banks towards elected policymakers (Daunfeldt et al., 2008) . The reason for this might be that independent central bank are widely believed to perform better at achieving low in ‡ation than central banks controlled by political policymakers. The theoretical background of this belief is the literature on time-inconsistency in monetery policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogo¤, 1985) .
There exists some empirical evidence that countries with independent central banks have better in ‡ation performance 1 . For example, a number of empirical studies (e.g., Cukierman et al., 1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993 ) have found a negative correlation between average in ‡ation and the degree of central bank independence (CBI), suggesting that in ‡ation might be brought down with CBI-reforms. However, these earlier studies only use data from a small set of, mostly highly industrialized, countries. This might be a problem since the importance of CBI-reforms might di¤er between countries on di¤erent levels of development 2 . It might therefore be desirable to increase the number of countries under study.
In addition, previous studies do not adress the question of causality, since correlation analysis is not su¢ cient for establishing a causal relationship 1 For an overview, see Cukierman (2008) . 2 Cukierman et al., (2002) studies the relation between in ‡ation and CBI in 26 former socialist countries during their transition to market economies. Their evidence shows that in ‡ation is unrelated to CBI, at least in the early stages of economic liberalization. The study by Cukierman et al., (1993) presents results that indicates no correlation between CBI and in ‡ation in up to 70 developing countries. between variables. In this case it might be that low in ‡ation cause CBI, rather than that the CBI cause low in ‡ation. Or there might be a variable omitted from the model that causes both CBI and low in ‡ation, for example social attitudes (Posen, 1993; Hayo, 1998) . It has also been noted that CBIindicies are characterized by a large subjectivity bias (Forder, 1996 (Forder, , 1998 Mangano, 1998) . This paper is an attempt to adress some of the problems inherent in most earlier empirical studies on CBI and in ‡ation performance. The paper is focused on possible changes in the legal independence of the central banks, instead on the level of CBI. Therefore, as the reforms by de…nition have increased CBI, the analysis is not distorted by the subjectivity bias that plagues the most commonly used indicies of CBI (see also Daunfeldt and de Luna 2008) 3 . The analysis is based on a novel data set compiled by Daunfeldt et al. (2008) , covering the possible occurence of CBI-reforms in 133 countries during the period 1980-2005. This means that the study includes more countries than any previous study on CBI and in ‡ation performance.
The purpose of this paper is to study whether countries that have implemented CBI-reforms perform better in terms of in ‡ation performance than countries that have not implemented such institutional reforms. Legal reforms that are considered as CBI-reforms in this paper are reforms that formally decreases the in ‡uence of elected policymakers on monetary policy 4 .
The study is based on a di¤erence-in-di¤erence methodology, and it is closely related to a study by Ball and Sheridan (2005) . The di¤erence-indi¤erence methodology has also previously been used to identify the e¤ect of a change in institutional factors, for example a change of a law (see e.g., Meyer, 1995) . Ball and Sheridan (2005) used the di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach to study whether in ‡ation targeting improved in ‡ation performance in a sample of 20 OECD-countries. Their results indicated that although targeters improved average in ‡ation performance more than non-targeters, this result was no longer true when one controlled for regression to the mean.
In this paper, instead of comparing targeters and non-targeters, countries that have implemented CBI-reforms are compared to countries that have not implemented such reforms during the study period. In accordance with Ball and Sheridan (2005) , the statistical phenomenom of regression to the mean is controlled for by including average in ‡ation in the pre-reform period as an explanatory variable. In addition, the initial levels of CBI are included in the dataset to, following Willard (2006) , be used as an instrument. This makes sense since the usefulness of making a reform, for improving in ‡ation performance, might be in ‡uenced by the historical level of independence. Also, a sensitivity analysis is performed whereby di¤erent countries are included or excluded from the regressions, depending on their level of in ‡ation in the pre-reform period.
The results from the full sample in this paper indicate that CBI-reforms have no signi…cant in ‡uence on in ‡ation performance once regression to the mean is accounted for. Thus, the paper does not support the popular view that reforms that delegates authority from politicians to independent central banks are important for improving in ‡ation performance. There is though some evidence in the data that the e¢ ciency of a CBI-reform might be higher in countries characterized by historically high in ‡ation rates compared to countries that have had low in ‡ation rates. For the countries that did not provide any answer, the dates of CBI-reforms were obtained by using other information channels (e.g., central bank acts, central bank publications, and scienti…c articles). These kind of sources were also used to validate the answers obtained by e-mail.
The data set used in this paper consist of a panel of 133 countries over the period 1980-2005, meaning that we have information on the possible occurence of CBI-reforms in about 81 percent of the countries that were initially contacted by e-mail. As many as 89 of these 133 countries had granted their central banks more independence from political policymakers during the study period. The implementation years of CBI-reforms are displayed in Table A1 in the appendix; whereas Table A2 shows countries with no information on CBI-reforms. Note that in ‡ation data is missing for …ve countries 6 , thereby reducing the number of countries to 128.
The countries in the dataset are classi…ed as either reform-or non-reform countries. In this paper, for the reform-countries, time is partitoned into a pre-reform period and a post-reform period. The break between the periods is de…ned as being the year when a CBI-reform was implemented. Thus, the post-period is being de…ned as beginning the year a CBI-reform is formally implemented according to the data. In order to use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, a break point between the pre-reform and post-reform period needs to be de…ned for the the countries that did not implement any CBIreforms during the study period. Following Ball and Sheridan (2005), for non-reform countries, the break between periods is de…ned as the unweighted average year of when CBI-reforms were implemented in reform countries, which is 1998. In the next step average in ‡ation is calculated for both the pre-reform period and post-reform period, for all the countries in the sample, using in ‡ation measures from the IMF Financial Statistics.
Descriptive statistics
The time series for mean and median in ‡ation for reform and non-reform countries from 1980 to 2005 are presented in Figure 1 and 2, respectively.
Clearly the in ‡ation rates are typically much lower in the end of the study period, both for reform and non-reform countries. There are only eight countries in the sample that experience a higher in ‡ation rate in the postreform period. Note that the mean in ‡ation rates are somewhat lower for reform countries in the post-period, although it was higher in the pre-reform period, giving the impression that CBI-reforms are important for improving in ‡ation performance. Table 1 . The variables included are further discussed in Section 3.
- Table 1 about here -The aim of this paper is to investigate whether CBI-reforms improves in ‡a-tion performance. To do this we have to distinguish between reform-and non-reforms countries. This is done by comparing in ‡ation performance in reform and non-reform countries using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, where reform-and non-reform countries are distinguished in the dataset by a dummy variable. As a …rst comparison, the following regression model (Model I) is estimated: 
In this case the coe¢ cient for the CBI-dummy ( 1 ) indicates whether CBI-reforms a¤ects country i´s in ‡ation performance, for a given level of in ‡ation in the pre-reform period 8 .
One potential problem with equations (1) the country is an English speaking country or not is used to predict the value of the dummy. This instrument is probably valid, since in ‡ation is likely not 7 A well known example of this is that athletes in team sports that have been extremely successful in their rookie year, …nd it almost impossible to live up to expectations during their sophomore year. More generally, an athlete's superior performance is likely to be followed by poorer performance, due to regression alone (Gilovich, 1991) . 8 The variable CBI pre was included as an explanatory variable in a third model, but dropped due to endogeniety problems. Note also that this variable is not used in earlier studies.
directly in ‡uenced by language. Also, the initial levels of CBI might be used to predict the value of the dummy. The likelihood of a CBI-reform is in this case …rst estimated using the following probit model:
where the variable English is a dummy variable taking the value one if english is an o¢ cial language in the country; CBI Then, in the next step, the estimated probability of a CBI-reform, c D i ; is used to estimate whether CBI-reforms are important for improving in ‡ation performancce, i.e.:
Note that equation (4) does not control for the statistical phenomenom "regression to the mean". However, as previously noted, in ‡ation in the pre-reform period might be endogenously determined and it is di¢ cult to obtain suitable instrumental variables. To control for the e¤ect of regression to the mean in some other way, the sample was split into a low -and high in ‡ation group, according to a criteria explained below. As the results might be sensitive to the inclusion of countries in the low and high in ‡ation group, a sensitivity analysis was also conducted.
First, all countries were ranked according to the level of in ‡ation in the pre-period, and then partitioned into decentiles, with all outliers and extreme values excluded. The di¤erence in in ‡ation between the pre -and post-reform period was then regressed against the reform dummy for different percentages of the whole sample. Formally, the following regressions were estimated: 
Results
The results from estimating equations (1)- (2) are presented in Table 2 .
The null hypothesis that CBI-reforms does not matter for in ‡ation performance can be rejected on all reasonable signi…cance level in Model I.
The results thus indicate that reform countries have improved average in‡ation performance more than non-reform countries, supporting the belief that CBI-reforms are helpful in achieving price stability.
However, in Model II, when average in ‡ation in the pre-reform period is included as an explanatory variable to control for the possibility of regression to the mean, the results does not indicate that CBI-reforms significantly matter for in ‡ation performance. The estimated coe¢ cient for the pre-reform in ‡ation is 0.60, and statistically signi…cant on all reasonable signi…cance levels, indicating a strong regression to the mean. In accordance with the results presented in Ball and Sheridan (2005) , it thus seems important to include in ‡ation in the pre-reform period to control for regression to the mean 9 .
As described in the previous section, the estimated probability of a CBIreform is used in the next step, instead of a CBI-reform, as an explanatory variable to control for endogenity problems. The results from the probit estimation (eq. 3) is presented in Table A3 in the appendix and the results from estimating equation (4) are presented in table 3.
- Table 3 about here -
As can be seen from table 3, the results does not indicate that the probability of a CBI-reform signi…cantly a¤ect in ‡ation performance.
The regression for the low-in ‡ation group (eq. 5a) was …rst run for only ten percent of the countries, i.e., those with an in ‡ation level of 3.2 percent or lower in the pre-period. Then a corresponding regression for all other countries (the high in ‡ation group), i.e., for those with an in ‡ation level higher than 3.2 percent was estimated. In the second step, the low in ‡ation group was de…ned as the twenty percent of the countries that had the lowest pre-reform in ‡ation rates, i.e., those with an in ‡ation level in the pre-period lower than 4.6 percent. The high in ‡ation group correspondingly included all countries (80% of the sample) with a pre-reform in ‡ation rate above 4.6 percent, and so on. The results from the estimations, using the CBI-dummy, D i , are presented in the Table 4 .
- Table 4 about here -
The results indicate that the CBI-dummy in general is negatively correlated with in ‡ation performance for countries with a pre-in ‡ation rate lower than 9.6%, implying that countries that not had implemented CBI-reforms had reduced in ‡ation more than countries that had choosen to delegate power from politicians to an independent central bank. One possible explanation is that the group of countries with modest in ‡ation might include countries with stable political systems that are able to adopt low in ‡ation policies without the necessity of implementing formal CBI-reforms (for a similar explanation, see Daunfeldt and de Luna, 2008) . The reforms were then perhaps only adopted as part of a package of reforms aimed at tran-sition towards a market economy or joining a political union. Or it may simply be a re ‡ection of the regression to the mean detected in Model II.
When more countries are included in the low-in ‡ation group, no signi…cant results were found. The results then, seems to be sensitive to which countries are included in the low-in ‡ation group.
Turning to the high-in ‡ation countries, the results indicate that the CBIdummy is positive and signi…cantly determined at the 10% level for most countries. Thus, CBI-reforms seem e¢ cient in bringing down in ‡ation in countries characterized by high in ‡ation rates, whereas this does not seem to be the case for low in ‡ation countries. For regressions restricted to twenty percent of the countries with the highest pre-in ‡ation rates there seems to be no signi…cant e¤ects of doing a CBI-reform.
When the same analysis was performed using the probability of implementing a CBI-reform (Table 5) , c D i , no signi…cant results were found, indicating that it is the reform itself rather than the probalility to make a reform that seem to matter.
- Table 5 According to the results presented in this paper the coe¢ cient for the CBI-reform dummy is positively related to in ‡ation performance, indicating that countries that have implemented CBI-reforms have brought down in‡ation more than countries that have not implemented such reforms. This result is, however, no longer true when one control for regression to the mean.
The empirical analysis was a¤ected by endogeniety problems in the sense that the independent variables are correlated with the error term. To correct for the probable bias in the estimation of the e¤ect of the reform dummy, a regression was run using the predicted values of the reform dummy, rather than the reform dummy itself. This regression gave no signi…cant results, maybe indicating that it is the reform itself rather than the probalility to make a reform that matter for some countries. Also, the level of in ‡ation in the pre-period was probably endogenously determined. Since no suitable intrumental variable was found, countries were instead ranked according to the level of in ‡ation in the pre-period, and then partitioned into di¤erent groups. The di¤erence in in ‡ation between the pre -and post-reform period was then regressed against the reform dummy for di¤erent percentages of the whole sample. According to the results presented in the paper, CBIreforms seem more e¢ cient in improving in ‡ation performance in countries that have been characterized by historically high in ‡ation rates; while this e¤ect was not not present in countries with low in ‡ation rates in the prereform period. On the other hand, no signi…cant results were found when the probability of a CBI-reform was used instead of the CBI-dummy.
Hence, this paper does not support the popular view that a CBI-reform is important for improving a countrys in ‡ation performance. The e¢ cacy of a CBI-reform seem instead to depend on in ‡ation experience in the past, suggesting that CBI-reforms are not important for reducing in ‡ation rates in low-in ‡ation countries. In these countries it might be the case that the politicians unemployment target coincides with the natural rate of unemployment, therby eliminating any need for a CBI-reform to reduce in ‡ation levels. In high in ‡ation countries, on the other hand, a CBI-reform might be needed in order to achieve credibility for a low in ‡ation rule. In ‡ation pre-period ( 2 ) .60 4.55 
